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Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and
Fiduciary Administration
by Mary F. Radford*
This Article describes selected cases and significant legislation from
June 1, 2013 through May 31, 2014 pertaining to Georgia fiduciary law
and estate planning.'

I. GEORGIA CASES
A.

Will Construction
The case of Banner v. Vandeford2 confirms the long-standing rule that
if a will is clear and unambiguous on its face, a court will not, by
construction, reform the will to give it a different meaning or effect.' In
this case, the Georgia Supreme Court was asked to construe a will that

* Marjorie Fine Knowles Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law.
Newcomb College of Tulane University (BA., 1974); Emory University (J.D., 1981).
Reporter, Probate Code Revision Committee, Guardianship Code Revision Committee, and
Trust Code Revision Committee of the Fiduciary Section of the State Bar of Georgia. Past
President, American College of Trust and Estate Counsel.
Author, GEORGIA
GUARDIANSHIPS AND CONSERVATORSHIPS (West, 2014-15 ed.); REDFEARN: WILLS AND
ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGA (West, 7th ed. 2008); GEORGA TRusTs & TRUSTEES (West,

2014-15 ed.). The Author is grateful to Georgia State University College of Law graduates
Sarah Kinsman and Kristin Poland for their research assistance.
1. For an analysis of Georgia fiduciary law and estate planning during the prior survey
period, see Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships,and FiduciaryAdministration,
Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 65 MERCER L. REV. 295 (2013).
2. 293 Ga. 654, 748 S.E.2d 927 (2013).
3. Id. at 655, 748 S.E.2d at 929; See v. Mitchell, 287 Ga. 551, 553, 700 S.E.2d 338
(2010); Folsom v. Rowell, 281 Ga. 494, 498, 640 S.E.2d 5, 8 (2007); DuBose v. Box, 246 Ga.
660, 663, 273 S.E.2d 101, 106 (1980); First Natl Bank of Atlanta v. Robinson, 209 Ga. 582,
586, 74 S.E.2d 875, 878 (1953); Stahl v. Russell, 206 Ga. 699, 701, 58 S.E.2d 135, 136
(1950).
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contained no residuary clause.4 The testator, John Huscusson, was
survived by three adult daughters: Tina, Deborah, and Karen.5 John
executed a will in 2006 that left his entire estate to his three daughters
equally. In 2012, John executed another will, specifically revoking his
previous will. The 2012 will expressed his extreme disappointment with
Deborah and Karen, leaving bequests of $10 to each of them. He did not
give Tina a bequest of money, but he did name her as executrix of his
estate.' The appellant's brief explained that the original draft of the
will contained a residuary clause that left the remainder of John's estate
to his daughter Tina. The testator made a revision on the first page,
which the testator's lawyer incorporated into the draft. Unfortunately,
the lawyer then printed only the first page on which the revision had
been made, not realizing that the residuary clause had been pushed to
the second page.'
The supreme court noted that the 2012 will consisted of seven
consecutively numbered pages that were each initialed by John,
contained no incomplete sentences, and was made up of numbered
paragraphs that appeared to properly follow each other.9 Deborah and
Karen filed a declaratory judgment action in probate court seeking an
interpretation of the will. The probate court found that the will was
plain and unambiguous and that without a residuary clause, the gift of
the residue lapsed and was required to pass by intestacy.'
The
intestate heirs" of the testator were all three of the daughters. Tina
appealed to the supreme court. She first argued that the probate court
did not follow John's true intentions in that he desired to disinherit
Deborah and Karen. She claimed the probate court should have
interpreted the will as leaving the residue of the estate to her alone.' 2
The supreme court disagreed and affirmed the probate court's
ruling.' s The court noted that courts do not have the authority to

4. Banner, 293 Ga. at 654, 748 S.E.2d at 928. "A residuary testamentary gift includes
all the property of the estate that is not effectively disposed of by other provisions of the
will." O.C.GA. § 53-4-59 (2011).
5. Banner, 293 Ga. at 654, 748 S.E.2d at 928.
6. Id
7. Brief of Appellant, Banner, 293 Ga. 654, 748 S.E.2d 927 (No. S13A1291), 2013 WL
2337169.
8. Id. at *4.
9. Banner, 293 Ga. at 654, 748 S.E.2d at 928.
10. Id.
11. See O.C.GA. §§ 53-2-1(c)(3), -4-65(b) (2011).
12. Banner, 293 Ga. at 654-55, 748 S.E.2d at 928.
13. Id.

20141

WILLS, TRUSTS & GUARDIANSHIPS

233

rewrite, by construction, an unambiguous will. 14 The paramount object
of construction is to determine "the intention of the testator by looking
to [the] four corners [of the will] and giving consideration to all of its
parts."15 Here, the will flowed clearly, did not have any page or
paragraph breaks, and its terms were plain and unambiguous; thus, its
terms must control.1" The court recognized that, while it is unusual for
a testator to omit a residuary clause, the court could not supply one.17
Tina tried to persuade the court that the will's residuary distribution
scheme was ambiguous because it provided that "[i]f... no beneficiaries
...

survive me, I give all my estate to those persons who would have

been entitled thereto under the laws of descent and distribution ... as
if I had died intestate." 8 However, the court found the provision shed
no light on John's intention regarding how the remainder should be
distributed to the named beneficiaries who did actually survive him."9
Finally, Tina contended that the probate court erred in refusing to allow
the attorney who drafted John's will to testify that John wanted Tina to
inherit the remainder of his estate." The court held that, because the
will contained no ambiguities, parol evidence could not be introduced to
contradict its terms even if the terms express a meaning that is entirely
at variance with the real intention of the testator.2' Without that rule,
the court noted that no will would be able to "hold up to parol evidence
of witnesses who come forward after the testator's demise."22
B.

Trusts and Trustees
During the reporting period, the Georgia appellate courts dealt with
four trust cases that discussed whether the trustees had breached their
fiduciary duties and, in that context, examined the statute of limitations
for bringing actions for such a breach. Two of these cases, Reliance
3 and
Trust Co. v. Candler"
Rollins v. Rollins,24 had already been
reviewed by the supreme court and have been discussed in previous

14. Id. at 654, 748 S.E.2d at 928.
15. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Mitchell, 216 Ga. 526, 527, 117 S.E.2d 901, 902 (1961))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 655, 748 S.E.2d at 929.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 655, 748 S.E.2d at 929.
20. Id. at 656, 748 S.E.2d at 929.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 294 Ga. 15, 751 S.E.2d 47 (2013).
24. 294 Ga. 711, 755 S.E.2d 727 (2014).
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issues of the Mercer Law Review.25 The decision in Rollins is discussed
in this year's Annual Survey of Georgia Law by Crystal J. Clark and
Kristi K. North,2 6 and the decision in Reliance is discussed below. The
27 and Smith v. SunTrust Bank,2"
other two cases, Hasty v. Castleberry
were appealed from the trial courts to the Georgia Supreme Court and
the Georgia Court of Appeals respectively.
1. Statute of Limitations. Section 53-12-307 of the Official Code
of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) 2 provides that the statute of limitations for actions against a trustee will be either two or six years."0 The
six-year period begins to run at the time "the beneficiary discovered, or
reasonably should have discovered, the subject of such claim."' The
six-year period is narrowed to two years if the beneficiary "received a
report which adequately discloses
the existence of a claim against the
32
trustee for a breach of trust.
The trustee in Hasty v. Castleberrywas sued by his sister for breach
of fiduciary duty, mismanagement of the trust's assets, and the collection
of excessive trustee fees. The trust was designed to support the
children's mother for her life and then pay the remainder to the trustee,
his sister, and another sibling.33 The support provided for the mother
consisted of both a mandatory payment to her of the income from the
trust and any encroachments on the trust corpus that the trustee
deemed necessary to provide for the mother's "proper support [or]
maintenance, or to enable her to meet any difficulty produced by
sickness, accident, or similar cause."' 4 While the mother was alive, the
trustee, who was the co-chair of a fundraising campaign for a local
university, used trust funds to make a $1 million donation to the
university on his mother's behalf.35 The trial court granted partial

25. For a discussion of Reliance, see Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships,
and FiduciaryAdministration,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 64 MERCER L. REV. 325,
328-32 (2012). For a discussion of Rollins, see Crystal J. Clark, Business Associations,
Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 65 MERCER L. REV. 55, 55-56 (2013).
26. Crystal J. Clarke & Kristi K North, Business Associations, Annual Survey of
Georgia,66 MERCER L. REV. 15 (2014).
27. 293 Ga. 727, 749 S.E.2d 676 (2013).
28. 325 Ga. App. 531, 754 S.E.2d 117 (2014).
29. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-307 (2011).
30. Id.
31. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-307(a).
32. Id.
33. Hasty, 293 Ga. at 727-28, 749 S.E.2d at 679.
34. Id. at 728, 749 S.E.2d at 679 (alteration in original).
35. Id. In Reinhardt University v. Castleberry, 318 Ga. App. 416, 734 S.E.2d 117
(2012), the court of appeals affirmed the imposition of a constructive trust on the $1 million
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summary judgment to the sister, and the trustee appealed. When sued
by his sister, the trustee contended that she had failed to file her claim
within the applicable statute of limitations of two years. The trustee
claimed that an accountant's letter, which he showed his sister and
which disclosed the donation, constituted a sufficient report to narrow
the statute of limitations to two years.3" Although the term "report" is
not defined in that particular statute, 7 the supreme court adopted a
definition from the statute on trustee accounting, O.C.G.A. § 53-12243(a),3 8 which requires a report from a trustee to a beneficiary to
include "the assets, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements of the trust,
...including the trust provisions that describe or affect such beneficiary's interest."' The supreme court held that the accountant's letter,
which was simply a general correspondence without any details, did not
constitute a sufficient report to shorten the statute of limitations and
that the sister filed her claim within the six-year time frame.4°
The co-trustees in Smith v. SunTrust Bank were the co-trustees of the
1969 Fisher Family trust. The sole original asset of the trust was a 15%
interest in a piece of Atlanta real estate, "Century Center," which was
under a ninety-year lease for a large office park development. The trust
established three subtrusts: Trust A, Trust B, and Trust C. 41 The
income from Trust A was allocated to Fisher's only child, Emily Fisher
Crum. Trust B's income was to be equally distributed among seventeen
named beneficiaries or their descendants per stirpes.4 2 The income of
Trust C was to be distributed to any one or more of a group consisting
of the Trust A and Trust B beneficiaries as the corporate trustee,
SunTrust, determined "necessary for the maintenance, health, support
and education of each member of such group, taking into consideration
any means of support which any such member is known by [SunTrust]
to have, and accumulating any income not so paid." 3 The trust
required an annual accounting to the beneficiaries who held a present
interest in the subtrust. Emily and another individual were named as

donation despite the university's contention that it had not engaged in any wrongdoing.
Id. at 419, 734 S.E.2d at 119. This case is discussed in Radford, supra note 1, at 303.
36. Hasty, 293 Ga. at 727, 730, 749 S.E.2d at 678, 680-81.
37. Id. at 731-32, 749 S.E.2d at 681; see also O.C.G.A. § 53-12-307.
38. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-243(a) (2011).
39. Hasty, 293 Ga. at 731-32, 749 S.E.2d at 681 (quoting O.C.G.A § 53-12-243(a)).
40. Id. at 732, 749 S.E.2d at 681.

41. Smith, 325 Ga. App. at 531-32, 754 S.E.2d at 119. The trust allocated 10% of the
trust's interest in Century Center to Trust A, 60% to Trust B, and 30% to Trust C. Id. at
532, 754 S.E.2d at 119.
42. Id. at 531-32, 754 S.E.2d at 119.
43. Id. at 532, 754 S.E.2d at 120 (alteration in original).
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individual trustees, and SunTrust was named as the corporate trustee.
The complaining beneficiaries were Rob Smith, one of the seventeen
named B beneficiaries, and the three children of Roy Smith, Sr., who
was one of the seventeen named B beneficiaries."
On October 1, 1979, the trustees conveyed the trust's entire interest
in the Century Center property to the settlor's widow, Bessie, for
$300,000, the appraisal price from five months earlier. Minutes later,
Bessie conveyed the property interest to Emily and her husband.45 The
trust account statements for the fourth quarter of 1979 contained a
notation stating that the property had been "Sold to Bessie."
Rob
Smith contended he never received this statement; however, the
remaining beneficiaries conceded that their father received the
statement. All four beneficiaries claimed they did not know of the
"straw-man" conveyance that occurred until this litigation commenced
in 2011. The beneficiaries also alleged that the property interest, which
had not been otherwise exposed to the market, was substantially
undervalued at $300,000. In addition, they contended that SunTrust
breached its fiduciary duty by distributing all of Trust C's income to
Emily, beginning in 1969, despite the means test applicable to distributions from Trust C.47 A trust officer sent a letter to the current
beneficiaries of Trust C on June 5, 1990, explaining the trust's distributions. The letter noted that SunTrust had not received any other
requests for the income but that the beneficiaries should contact them
if they would like SunTrust to consider a distribution to them. None of
the beneficiaries responded or complained. Rob Smith contended that
he never received this letter; however, the remaining beneficiaries
admitted they had received it. The beneficiaries claimed that they never
received income distributions from Trust C or any accounting statements

44. Id. at 531-32, 534 & n.4, 754 S.E.2d at 119, 121 & n.4.
45. Id. at 533, 754 S.E.2d at 120.
46. Id. at 534, 754 S.E.2d at 121.
47. Id. at 534-35, 754 S.E.2d at 120-21. Originally, Emily requested the income to help
pay estate taxes levied on her father's estate following his death, which was granted
without any regard for the means test. The other beneficiaries claimed that SunTrust
never informed them that it was paying all of the income to Emily during this time. In
1989, SunTrust assigned a new trust officer to Trust C, who discontinued the automatic
payments to Emily until she provided financial information showing her need for continued
distributions. Emily refused, and the officer ultimately resumed the distributions without
receiving the financial information necessary to apply the means test. In 1998, a new
officer was assigned to administer Trust C, and that new officer described the income
distributions as a "debacle," but determined that it was best left "as is." Id. at 534-36, 754
S.E.2d at 121-22.
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for Trust C reflecting the income distributions to Emily to the exclusion
of all other beneficiaries."
In August 2011, the trustees filed a Petition for Trust Modification
and Termination of the Trust because the list of beneficiaries, which was
lengthy at the trust's inception, had grown to include the multiple lineal
descendants of deceased named beneficiaries, which resulted in a
dramatic increase in administrative costs and burdens compared to the
values of Trust B and Trust C (at that time, B was valued at $305,000
and C was valued at $79,200). In March 2012, the beneficiaries filed
their objection, claiming that the trustees breached their fiduciary duty
due to the Century Center straw-man transaction and the distributions
to Emily. The beneficiaries sought equitable relief, which included
requiring Emily to transfer the Century Center property back to the
trust. The trustees then moved for summary judgment on several
grounds, including that the breach of fiduciary duty claims were barred
by the statute of limitations.4 9 The beneficiaries argued that there
were genuine issues of material fact whether the trustees had fraudulently concealed the breaches, and therefore, the limitation period had
been tolled under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96,5" which says that "the period of
limitation shall run only from the time of the plaintiff's discovery of the
fraud."5 After a hearing, the trial court granted the trustees' motion
for summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue, and the
beneficiaries appealed to the court of appeals.5"
Regarding the Century Center property straw-man transaction, the
court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling.5 3 The court noted that
"[glenerally speaking, the question of whether there was fraudulent
concealment justifying the tolling of the limitation period 'is a proper
question for determination by a jury."'54 In this case, the beneficiaries
presented some evidence that the trustees fraudulently concealed their
breach of fiduciary duty. The beneficiaries focused on the general rule
that a trustee cannot purchase the property belonging to a trust estate,
that beneficiaries have the same rights when a transaction occurred with
the use of a straw-man as they would if the sale had been direct to the
trustee, and that the account statements suggested that the trustees
48. Id. at 535-36, 754 S.E.2d at 121-22.
49. Id. at 536-37, 754 S.E.2d at 122-23. For a discussion of the statute of limitations
for suits against trustees, see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
50. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 (2007).
51. Smith, 325 Ga. App. at 537-38, 754 S.E.2d at 123 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96).
52. Id. at 537, 754 S.E.2d at 123.
53. Id. at 546, 754 S.E.2d at 129.
54. Id. at 539, 754 S.E.2d at 124 (quoting Brown v. Brown, 209 Ga. 620, 622, 75 S.E.2d
13, 17 (1953)).
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were complying with the provisions of the trust in an above-board
transaction.5 5
Accordingly, the court held that a genuine issue of material fact
existed pertaining to whether there was fraudulent concealment and
whether the limitation period had tolled.56 The court also noted that
the fourth-quarter statements that contained the notation "Sold to
Bessie," without more, did not constitute a written report that adequately disclosed the existence of a claim to the beneficiaries. 57 However, the
court also held that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether the beneficiaries exercised due diligence to discover the trustees'
fraudulent conveyance of the property.58
Next, the court addressed the distributions to Emily.59 The court
held that a genuine issue of material fact existed, regarding only Rob
Smith, on the question of whether SunTrust had fraudulently concealed
the distributions to Emily to the exclusion of all of the other beneficiaries.' ° The court noted that Rob Smith presented some evidence of the
fraudulent concealment in his testimony:
SunTrust never provided him with a copy of the Trust instrument so
that he would know his rights to disbursement with respect to Trust
C, never informed him that he was potentially entitled to distributions
as a beneficiary of Trust C, and never provided him with an annual
accounting of the disbursements from Trust C despite being required
to do so by the Trust.61
Further, a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Rob
Smith received the June 5, 1990 letter that would have put him on
notice of the distributions and would thus show that he failed to exercise
due diligence to discover the misconduct.62
However, the court held that the statutes of limitations on the
remaining beneficiaries' breach claims "were not tolled because, as a
matter of law, they failed to exercise due diligence to discover" the
disbursements and thus could not establish fraudulent concealment.63

55. Id. at 539-40, 542, 754 S.E.2d at 124, 126.
56. Id. at 542, 754 S.E.2d at 126.
57. Id. at 534, 541, 754 S.E.2d at 121, 125 (adopting the same definition of report that
was used in Hasty, 293 Ga. at 731-32, 749 S.E.2d at 681). For a discussion of Hasty and
the definition of report, see supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
58. Smith, 215 Ga. App. at 541, 754 S.E.2d at 125.
59. Id. at 542, 754 S.E.2d at 126.
60. Id. at 543, 754 S.E.2d at 126-27.
61. Id. at 543, 754 S.E.2d at 126.
62. Id. at 543, 754 S.E.2d at 127.
63. Id.
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The court noted that these beneficiaries admitted to receiving the June
5, 1990 letter from SunTrust, which specifically informed them of the
distributions, over twenty years before making the claims in this
litigation." However, the court held that the beneficiaries would still
be able to assert their breach claims for the distributions that occurred
within six years of filing the claims in this case because each income
distribution by SunTrust to Emily that harmed them constituted a
separate cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.65
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the limitations
period was tolled because SunTrust fraudulently concealed that the bank
was breaching its duty to provide all beneficiaries with an annual
accounting of the income distributions from Trust C.66 The court
reversed the trial court's summary judgment ruling and held that a
genuine issue of material fact existed regarding this issue with respect
to Rob Smith, based on the same reasons as stated above.67 Further,
the court again reached a different result for the remaining beneficiaries,
who were put on notice in the June 5, 1990 letter but took no action to
obtain a copy of the trust instrument until this litigation.68 Again, the
court noted that this group's claims for SunTrust's failure to provide
them with an annual accounting within the six years prior to filing their
claims would not be barred.69
2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty. In 2012, in Reliance Trust Co. v.
Candler,7 ° the court of appeals affirmed a jury verdict of over $1 million
against the trustee and in favor of the remainder beneficiaries. 7' The
major question7 2 addressed by the supreme court was whether the jury

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 544, 754 S.E.2d at 127.
Id. at 544-45, 754 S.E.2d at 127-28.
Id. at 545, 754 S.E.2d at 128.
Id. at 545-46, 754 S.E.2d at 128.
Id. at 546, 754 S.E.2d at 128.
Id.

70. 315 Ga. App. 495, 726 S.E.2d 636 (2012). The remainder beneficiaries were the

grandchildren of a wife who set up a trust that would benefit her husband for his life. The
trust required the trustee to pay the income to the husband annually and additionally gave
the trustee discretion to make encroachments on the trust corpus in favor of the husband.
The trustee made several encroachments for the husband and, when he died, the
remainder beneficiaries sued to recoup those encroachments because the trustee abused
its discretion in making them. Reliance, 294 Ga. at 15, 16, 751 S.E.2d at 48-49.
71. Reliance, 315 Ga. App. at 501, 726 S.E.2d at 641.
72. The supreme court also addressed the court of appeals holding that Reliance should

be required to pay interest measured from the date of each encroachment on the trust
corpus. Reliance, 294 Ga. at 19, 751 S.E.2d at 51. The supreme court reversed the court
of appeals, stating that because the amounts that were paid out as encroachments

240

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

applied an improper standard of care in finding a breach of fiduciary
duty even though the jury also found that the trustee did not act in bad
faith.73 The jury was given the following instruction:
[A] court will interfere whenever the exercise of discretion by the
trustee is infected with fraud or bad faith, misbehavior, or misconduct,
arbitrariness, abuse of authority or perversion of the trust, oppression
of the beneficiary, or want of ordinary skill or judgment. The courts
will not ordinarily interpose to restrain the execution of a power,
except where abuse of discretion, bad faith, or fraud is shown, or where
the power is attempted to be exercised in a manner different from that
authorized by the donor.74
The court of appeals noted evidence showing that the actions of Reliance
Trust Co. (Reliance) were "infected with ... arbitrariness, as well as
oppression of the beneficiary [remaindermen]," and thus affirmed the
jury's verdict.75 On appeal to the supreme court, Reliance argued that
a trustee who is given absolute discretion can only breach its fiduciary
duty if it did not act in good faith.76 Reliance based this argument on
the wording of O.C.G.A. § 53-12-260, 77 which states, "Notwithstanding
the breadth of discretion granted to a trustee in the trust instrument,
including the use of such terms as 'absolute,' 'sole,' or 'uncontrolled,' the
trustee shall exercise a discretionary power in good faith."7" While
"[a]ssuming without deciding that this is a correct statement of the law,"
the supreme court held that Reliance waived this ground for appeal
because it was Reliance that requested the jury instruction that
contained the improper standard.79

remained in the trust and earned interest, this interest would have been paid to the life
beneficiary pursuant to the trust terms and thus would not have added value to the corpus
that would eventually go to the remaindermen. Id.
73. Id. at 16-17, 751 S.E.2d at 49.
74. Id. at 17, 751 S.E.2d at 49 (alteration in original). The supreme court noted that
this instruction, which was essentially a quote from an older Georgia case, had "been
widely applied by Georgia courts." Id.
75. Reliance, 315 Ga. App. at 500, 501, 726 S.E.2d at 641 (first alteration in original)
(quoting McPherson v. McPherson, 307 Ga. App. 548, 552, 705 S.E.2d 314, 319 (2011))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Reliance, 294 Ga. at 16, 751 S.E.2d at 49.
77. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-260 (2011).
78. Id.; Reliance, 294 Ga. at 16, 751 S.E.2d at 49. The supreme court noted in a
footnote that this statute had not been enacted until after the trial took place but said that
the parties seemed not to dispute whether the statute applied to the trust in question.
Reliance, 294 Ga. at 16 n.1, 751 S.E.2d at 49 n.1.
79. Reliance, 294 Ga. at 16, 18, 751 S.E.2d at 49, 50. The supreme court also
"[alssum[ed] without deciding" that the discretion given to the trust in this case was
"absolute." Id. at 16, 751 S.E.2d at 49.
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In Hasty v. Castleberry, regarding the question of the propriety of the
$1 million donation, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment for the sister, finding that the trustee had
breached his fiduciary duty by failing to administer the trust in
accordance with its terms and purpose-as required by O.C.G.A. § 53-12241 80-and by failing to balance fairly the interest of the life beneficiary
against the interest of the remainder beneficiaries. 8
The trustee
attempted to excuse his actions by claiming that he had been relying on
professional advice when he made the charitable contribution. 2 The
supreme court responded that while a trustee may rely on professional
advice to help exercise the powers that the trust gives a trustee, he could
not rely on professional advice to excuse the exercise of powers that
simply did not exist.83 The supreme court reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment to the sister on the question whether the
trustee had acted under an inherent conflict of interest as a matter of
law when he served both as co-chair of the fundraising campaign and as
trustee of the trust.8 4 The court stated the trustee received no tangible
personal benefit from the donation and that his position with the
university did not automatically put him in a position that was
antagonistic to the interest of the trust beneficiaries.85 However, the
court went on to state that the trustee "created a breach of trust by
choosing to take money from the corpus of the Trust" to make the
donation."8
The supreme court also examined whether the trustee mismanaged
the trust assets by leaving the bulk of the assets invested in one bank's
stock that decreased precipitously in value. 7 The trust provided that
"any investment made or retained by [the trustee] in good faith and with
reasonable prudence shall be proper."8 The trustee argued first that
corporate investors and insiders also failed to diversify their holdings in
the bank's stock, and second that the stock's historically high dividends
helped pay for the mother's expensive and prolonged health-care costs

80. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-241 (2011).
81. Hasty, 293 Ga. at 733, 749 S.E.2d at 682. For the facts of this case, see supra notes
33-40 and accompanying text
82. Hasty, 293 Ga. at 734, 749 S.E.2d at 683.

83. Id.
84.
85.

Id. at 735, 749 S.E.2d at 684.
Id. at 736, 749 S.E.2d at 684.

86. Id.
87. Id. at 736-37, 749 S.E.2d at 684-85.
88. Id. at 733, 749 S.E.2d at 682. O.C.G.A. §§ 53-12-340 and 53-12-341, which were
enacted in 2010 and deal expressly with a trustee's investment duties, were not cited by
the court. O.C.GA. §§ 53-12-340 to -341 (2011).
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and preserve the trust corpus. Additionally, the trustee contended that
he was merely abiding by his father's dying wish, given orally, not to sell
the stock.89 The sister responded with expert testimony, which
explained "that a large concentration of assets in a single security may
constitute an unacceptably high risk for a trustee" who has the duty to
90
preserve the principle of the trust for the remainder beneficiaries.
While noting that "[tihe fact that the stock value decreased precipitously
over time does not automatically mean that [the trustee] did not act
prudently by maintaining the [bank] stock as a trust asset," the supreme
court held that the trial court correctly reserved this question for the
91
jury because there remained genuinely disputed issues of fact.
Further, the court dismissed the trustee's oral-agreement claim because
oral agreements are "inadmissible as proof of a separate agreement
unless: (1) the written agreement... is silent as to the subject matter
of the instructions; (2) the oral instructions are not inconsistent with the
terms of the written agreement; and (3) the written agreement is not the
final agreement between the parties. 9 2 The court also affirmed the
trial court's refusal to grant summary judgment to the trustee regarding
93
the issue of whether he had collected excessive trustee fees.
Choice of Law Governing TRust
O.C.G.A. § 53-12-59' provides that if a settlor designates in the trust
instrument that a jurisdiction's laws will govern the meaning and effect
of the provisions of the trust, that designation will be respected "unless
the effect of the designation is contrary to the public policy of the
jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the matter at
issue." 5 In the trust in Morris v. Morris,9 6 the settlor chose Georgia
as the state whose laws would govern his trust. The trust provided that
in the event the settlor died intestate, the trust property should be
distributed to his living lineal descendants, if any, and if none, to his
living siblings.9
The settlor married and had one child. The trust was established and
administered in Georgia. The settlor and his wife moved to North
C.

89. Hasty, 293 Ga. at 736-37, 737 n.5, 749 S.E.2d at 684-85, 685 n.5.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 736-37, 749 S.E.2d at 684.
Id. at 736-37, 737 n.4, 749 S.E.2d at 684-85, 685 n.4.
Id. at 737 n.5, 749 S.E.2d at 685 n.5.
Id. at 738, 749 S.E.2d at 685.
O.C.G.A. § 53-12-5 (2011).
O.C.G.A. § 53-12-5(1).
326 Ga. App. 378, 756 S.E.2d 616 (2014).
Id. at 379-80, 756 S.E.2d at 618.
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Carolina but were later estranged. Sometime after their estrangement,
the settlor shot his minor daughter and then killed himself. He died
intestate. The mother brought a successful wrongful death action in
North Carolina against the father's estate and also sought to have the
trust assets distributed to the daughter's estate.98
Both Georgia and North Carolina have "slayer" statutes that address
what happens when an individual is killed by someone who will take
some sort of benefit at the victim's death.99 Georgia's statute simply
provides that the slayer forfeits any right to take property from the
victim's estate.100 The North Carolina statute provides, more broadly,
that the slayer is deemed to have predeceased the victim. 10' Thus,
under North Carolina law, the child would be deemed to have survived
her father and thus be the "living lineal descendantO" who would take
the trust property.'0 °
The court of appeals noted that the trust designated Georgia as the
governing law, the trust was established in Georgia while all parties to
the trust resided in Georgia, and the trust assets had always been kept
and managed in Georgia. 103 Thus, the court applied Georgia law and
determined that the child could not be deemed to have outlived her
father.' 4 The mother also tried to reach the trust assets by claiming
that the wrongful death judgment made her a creditor of the settlor. °5
She cited O.C.G.A. § 53-12-82(2),106 which allows the creditors of a
settlor of an irrevocable trust to "reach the maximum amount that...
could have been distributed to or for the settlor's benefit immediately
prior to the settlor's death."'
The court of appeals, strictly construing
the statute, held that the mother was not a creditor of the settlor at the

98.
99.

Id. at 378-79, 756 S.E.2d at 617.
O.C.G.A. § 53-1-5 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-24-5 (2013).

100. O.C.G.A. § 53-1-5(a).
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-24-5 provides,
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Article, solely for the purpose of
determining whether the victim is entitled to any right or benefit that depends on
surviving the death of a slayer under G.S. 31A-3, the slayer is deemed to have
predeceased the victim and the victim is deemed to have survived the slayer by
at least 120 hours (or any greater survival period required of the victim under the
slayer's will or other governing instrument) unless it is established by clear and
convincing evidence that the slayer survived the victim by at least 120 hours.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-24-5.
102. Morris, 326 Ga. App. at 380, 756 S.E.2d at 618.
103. Id. at 381, 756 S.E.2d at 619.
104. Id. at 381-82, 756 S.E.2d at 619.
105. Id. at 383, 756 S.E.2d at 620.
106. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-82(2) (2011).
107. Id.; Morris, 326 Ga. App. at 383, 756 S.E.2d at 620.
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time of his death." 8 The court of appeals went further and determined
that a holder of a tort judgment is not a creditor under Georgia law but
rather that the term applies narrowly to one who holds a claim in
contract.' 09

II.

GEORGIA LEGISLATION

A.

Testamentary Guardians
A "testamentary guardian" is an individual who is nominated in the
will of a parent to serve as the guardian of the parent's minor"0 child
or children in the event the parent dies while the child is still a
minor."' The probate court will appoint the individual who is nominated in the parent's will only if the other parent is no longer alive." 2
Prior to 2014, O.C.G.A. § 29-2-4"1 required the probate judge to issue
letters of testamentary guardianship to the parent's nominee without
notice or a hearing." 4 In other words, the surviving parent's nominee
became the guardian of the minor without any questioning by the court
whether the appointment of that nominee would be in the child's best
interests.'15 This principle was seen as an extension of parents'
constitutionally protected liberty
interest in raising their children
6
without state interference."
108. Morris, 326 Ga. App. at 384, 756 S.E.2d at 620-21.
109. Id. at 384, 756 S.E.2d at 621.
110. A "minor" is defined as an individual who is under age eighteen and not
emancipated. O.C.GA. § 29-1-1(11) (2007).
111. O.C.G.A. § 29-2-4 (2007 & Supp. 2014). For a general discussion of testamentary
guardians, see MARY F. RADFORD, GEORGIA GuARDIANsHIP & CONSERVATORSHIP § 2:7
(2013-14 ed.). The Revised Georgia Guardianship Code of 2005 also provides for the
appointment of a temporary conservator to handle the property that the minor child
inherits from the parent. O.C.G.A. § 29-3-5 (2007). The new legislation discussed in this
subsection does not apply to testamentary conservators.
112. O.C.G.A. § 29-2-4(b).
113. O.C.G.A. § 29-24.
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. This interest was discussed at length in Brooks v. Parkerson,265 Ga. 189, 454
S.E.2d 769 (1995), a case that involved grandparents' visitation rights. Id. at 189, 454
S.E.2d at 770. Zinkhan v. Bruce, 305 Ga. App. 510, 699 S.E.2d 833 (2010) quoted Brooks.
Id. at 515, 699 S.E.2d at 837. In Zinkhan, both parents named the father's brother as
testamentary guardian in their wills. The father murdered the mother and later killed
himself. The mother's relatives sought and were granted custody of the children in their
county of residence. The probate court granted letters of testamentary guardianship to the
brother without notice or a hearing. Id. at 510-11, 699 S.E.2d at 834. The court of appeals
affirmed that the probate court did not have to hold a hearing to consider the best interest
of the children before granting the letters because the guardian had been chosen by the
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O.C.G.A. § 29-2-4,"' as amended in 2014, now requires that, upon
the parent's death, notice must be given to certain relatives of the minor
who then have the opportunity to file objections to the appointment of
the parent's nominee."n If objections are fied, the amended statute
also requires that a hearing be held." 9 Under the new statute, when
a will that would result in the appointment of a testamentary guardian
is filed for probate, notice is to be served on the minor's adult siblings
and grandparents. 121 If there are no adult siblings or grandparents,
notice is to be given to "such child's great-grandparents, aunts, uncles,
great aunts, or great uncles, insofar as any such relative exists."'21
Any individual who receives notice and wishes to object must do so
within ten days of being served with notice. 122 The objection may not
be merely a broad objection (for example, a statement that the named
guardian is not fit to be guardian) but must instead 'include allegations
and facts [stating] with reasonable specificity why the nominated
testamentary guardian is unfit to serve."2 If an objection is filed, the
probate court must hold an "expedited hearing" within thirty days of the
date the last objection is filed. 2 ' At the hearing, the burden is on the
objecting party to show by clear and convincing evidence that the
individual nominated by the parent "is unfit to serve as testamentary
guardian."'25 If such a showing is not made, the court must award
letters of testamentary guardianship to the nominated testamentary
guardian. 2 ' The amended statute provides further that "[a]ny proceeding relating to the appointment of a1testamentary
guardian shall not
27
affect or delay the probating of a will."

children's parents. Id. at 511, 699 S.E.2d at 834. But see Stills v. Johnson, 272 Ga.645,
533 S.E.2d 695 (2000), in which the supreme court diverted from the long-standing
presumption in favor of a parent's right to choose who would be the custodian of a minor
child and applied a "best interest of the child" standard. Id. at 645, 533 S.E.2d at 697. See
also McFalls v.Onsager, 316 Ga. App. 190, 728 S.E.2d 820 (2012), in which the court of
appeals, citing Stills, applied the best interest standard and awarded custody to relatives
other than the relative chosen by the parents of the minor. Id. at 191-92, 728 S.E.2d at
821-22.
117. O.C.G.A. § 29-2-4 (Supp. 2014).
118. O.C.G.A. § 29-2-4(bX1)-(3).
119. O.C.G.A. § 29-2-4(b).
120. O.C.G.A. § 29-2-4(bX2).
121. Id.
122. O.C.G.A. § 29-2-4(b)(3).
123. Id.
124. O.C.G.A. § 29-2-4(b)(4).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. O.C.G.A. § 29-2-4(bX5).

